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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000848

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT

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TAGS: [BR](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [PREL](#)

SUBJECT: ENHANCING POL-MIL ENGAGEMENT WITH BRAZIL

REF: A. A) STATE 57700

[B. B\)](#) BRASILIA429

[C. C\)](#) BRASILIA 175

Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Per instructions in ref a, post has remained in discussions with the Brazilian MRE and MOD on how best to proceed with building a fuller, more cooperative political military relationship. When Poloffs asked MRE pol-mil advisor Marcos Pinta Gama for his views on prospects for enhancing our relations, he responded that there was great potential for progress and that the situation today is vastly improved from when he returned to Brasilia six years ago. While Pinta Gama's glass is half full, there is also an empty half consisting of stalled initiatives and slowdown tactics that have limited our engagement. Paragraph 2 lists several of the key areas for developing our pol-mil relationship with Brazil with comments on possible ways forward.

[1](#)2. (C) Areas for Pol-Mil engagement:

-- Defense Cooperation Agreement. The DoD-MOD agreed text was sent to the MRE in March where it remains. To move the DCA even as far as the back burner will take high-level intervention. Post recommends raising the importance of completing the DCA at all opportunities, but the current MRE leadership will likely remain opposed. Brazil's recent signing of similar agreements with other countries provides a precedent, but MRE opposition will likely continue.

-- Information Sharing Agreement. DoD has provided a draft text for a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) to the Office for Institutional Security (GSI) of Brazil. There has been a holdup thus far over confusion about the word "military" in the title. As Brazil does not differentiate between military and non-military controlled information, the proposal could be turned down on the grounds that it is not compatible with Brazilian practice. Post has been working with the Brazilian government to look past the title and focus on defining how to share information in a mutually beneficial manner. Pinta Gama confirmed that the MRE will play a large role in any decision to move ahead with an information sharing agreement (post recommends avoiding the term "GSOMIA"). Although to date he has concurred personally that such an agreement would be in Brazil's interest, his direct boss, Secretary General (vice minister) Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, is likely to throw up road blocks. Post recommends continuing to look for opportunities to underline to the Brazilians the importance of improving information sharing while pressing GSI for a constructive

response. The July visit of GSI head Gen. Felix to the U.S. will be the first such opportunity.

-- Jobim Visit to SOUTHCOM. The July visit of Defense Minister Jobim to Miami will provide an additional opportunity to press the points above and highlight the benefits to Brazil of a strong mil-mil relationship. In particular, SOUTHCOM should highlight how completing a DCA will open the door for broadening DoD-MOD cooperation through implementing arrangements that would not require MRE clearance. Other key issues for this trip will be reported septel.

-- POL-MIL Bilats. Brazil has postponed the next round of Pol-Mil bilats several times. The latest excuse for delay, according to Pinta Gama, was to allow "time to reflect" on Jobim's March visit to Washington. It seems unlikely that Pinta Gama's boss, MRE SG Guimaraes, will approve a bilat this year. As an interim measure, post recommends looking for an opportunity for PM AA/S Mull to visit Brasilia for discussions with Pinta Gama and other officials. Doing so will afford an opportunity to press for completion of the DCA and information sharing agreement, while allowing for discussion of technology transfer and other issues. Late July (either just before or after the Jobim trip) or October would be the best times for such a visit.

-- Defense Bilateral Working Group (BWG). In a familiar refrain, the Brazilians have also postponed the BWG--in this case, probably because of the workload generated by the Minister's regional travel. The current plan is to hold the

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BWG in October. Post will continue to press the MOD to settle on this timetable. The BWG will provide the opportunity to explore beginning a Defense Technology Security Dialogue that will promote Brazilian understanding of the security concerns that are behind our export controls.

-- Export Controls. We often hear the mantra from Brazilians that "the U.S. doesn't transfer technology" used as a reason for not having a better pol-mil relationship. While the Brazilians' own experiences (over 90% of USML cases approved) should argue against this, several high profile difficulties raise the perception that our export controls are overly strict when applied to Brazil. Post has made efforts to clarify these problems, generally the result of an exporter not following USG regulations and trying to blame USG policy, but such efforts have not prevented these problems being repeatedly raised with the Ambassador and other Mission personnel. Post recommends that part of a PM Assistant Secretary visit be a team from PM/DDTC, PM/RSAT, DTSA and Commerce to brief the Brazilians on U.S. policies and seek to clarify that the U.S. routinely transfers military technology to partner states, but in accordance with set procedures. We should also use Brazilian interest in acquiring F-18 fighter aircraft (reported septel) as a means to demonstrate that we have no difficulties transferring some of the best U.S. military technology to Brazil.

-- Defense Industry Dialogue. As suggested in reftels, such a dialogue would offer opportunities for partnership outside of government lanes and should be encouraged where possible.

-- Professional Civilian Training. Post supports the idea contained in reftel to seek means to provide professional training to Brazil's nascent Defense Ministry Civil Service. As the MOD is a comparatively new ministry, its civilian employees lack the experience and professional skills needed to make the Ministry effective. Post suggests seeking appropriate USG resources and opportunities to increase MOD professional expertise, perhaps through reciprocal visits and exchanges of information. This could be an appropriate subject for discussion at the next BWG.

SOBEL